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Abstract
The standard approach to providing interpretability to
deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) consists of vi-
sualizing either their feature maps, or the image regions
that contribute the most to the prediction. In this paper, we
introduce an alternative strategy to interpret the results of
a CNN. To this end, we leverage a Bag of visual Word rep-
resentation within the network and associate a visual and
semantic meaning to the corresponding codebook elements
via the use of a generative adversarial network. The rea-
son behind the prediction for a new sample can then be
interpreted by looking at the visual representation of the
most highly activated codeword. We then propose to ex-
ploit our interpretable BoW networks for adversarial ex-
ample detection. To this end, we build upon the intuition
that, while adversarial samples look very similar to real im-
ages, to produce incorrect predictions, they should activate
codewords with a significantly different visual representa-
tion. We therefore cast the adversarial example detection
problem as that of comparing the input image with the most
highly activated visual codeword. As evidenced by our ex-
periments, this allows us to outperform the state-of-the-art
adversarial example detection methods on standard bench-
marks, independently of the attack strategy.
1. Introduction
While the discriminative power of deep convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) is nowadays virtually uncontested,
one of the key research challenges that remain unaddressed
is their interpretability; in many practical scenarios, one is
not only interested in obtaining a prediction from the net-
work, but also in understanding the reason behind this pre-
diction. The main trends to tackle interpretability consist
of post-training analysis to visualize either feature maps at
different layers [36, 35] or the image regions that contribute
most to the decision [10, 46]. In this paper, we introduce an
alternative strategy to encode network interpretability via
the use of Bag of visual Words (BoW) representations.
BoW-based representations, such as histograms [24, 43,
47], VLAD [22, 2] and Fisher Vectors [45, 42], have a long-
Figure 1: Interpretable BoW networks. We use a GAN
to generate a visual codebook, from which we obtain the
codewords of a BoW model. This allows us to associate
a visual and semantic meaning to the codewords, and, as
shown in our experiments, to detect adversarial samples by
comparing the input image with the most highly activated
visual codeword.
standing history in the computer vision community. In the
current deep learning era, they have been re-visited to yield
novel, structured ways of pooling local activations into a
global image representation [1, 49]. In essence, these strate-
gies rely on measuring the distance between feature vectors
and a codebook that is learnt jointly with the network pa-
rameters. Here, we argue that this distance-based represen-
tation is inherently interpretable; it allows one to understand
the similarity between the input image and the codewords,
which can be thought of as prototypes. However, in ex-
isting architectures, the codewords do not have a human-
interpretable meaning, thus preventing one to visualize the
reason behind the network’s prediction.
In this paper, we therefore introduce an approach to pro-
vide an interpretable meaning to the codebook of a BoW
network. Specifically, we propose to associate a visual and
semantic representation to each codeword. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, this is achieved by making use of a generative ad-
versarial network (GAN) [13, 44] that maps latent vectors
to images. These images are then passed through the same
base network as the one at the core of our BoW model, and
we take the resulting feature vectors as our codebook ele-
ments. We then fine-tune the BoW model for classification
with this codebook, which, in essence, allows it to learn a
similarity between an input image and the images associ-
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ated with the codewords. Ultimately, given a new image,
observing the most highly activated codewords yields a vi-
sual and semantic interpretation of the network’s prediction.
As a second contribution, we propose to leverage our in-
terpretable BoW networks to detect adversarial examples,
that is, images to which a small amount of structured noise
has been added so as to fool a pre-trained network. To this
end, we rely on the intuition that an adversarial example
(i) looks similar to the unaltered, but unknown, image; and
(ii) to produce an erroneous prediction, will have a high ac-
tivation for a codeword that corresponds to the wrong class.
The image associated with this codeword, however, consti-
tutes a prototype of this wrong class, and thus will look very
different from the adversarial example itself. We therefore
cast adversarial example detection as the problem of com-
paring the adversarial image with the visual representation
of the most highly activated codeword.
Our experiments demonstrate that our interpretable BoW
networks (i) yield visually and semantically meaningful
representations; (ii) are more robust than traditional CNNs
to adversarial examples; and (iii) yield codewords whose vi-
sual representation can be effectively exploited to detect ad-
versarial examples and even out-of-distribution examples.
In particular, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art
adversarial example detection methods on standard bench-
marks for state-of-the-art attack strategies, such as CW [5],
FGSM [14], and BIM [28]. We will make our code publicly
available upon acceptance of the paper.
2. Related Work
BoW representations. Automatically recognizing objects
in images and videos is central to a wide variety of ap-
plication domains, such as security and autonomous driv-
ing. Visual recognition has therefore been one of the fun-
damental goals of computer vision since its inception. Prior
to 2012, most methods followed a two-step pipeline com-
prised of handcrafted feature extraction from the images
and separately training a classifier. Bags of visual Words
(BoW) [24, 43, 47], that is, histograms extracted by com-
paring local features to the elements of a codebook obtained
from the training data, quickly became popular handcrafted
representations. They were then extended to VLAD [22]
and Fisher Vectors [45, 42], which encode higher-order
statistics of the data with respect to the codewords. Af-
ter AlexNet’s impressive performance [27], much of the
visual recognition research moved to employing deep net-
works. While most architectures extract the final image
representation using standard convolutions, a few works at-
tempted to leverage knowledge from the handcrafted fea-
tures era. In particular, [12] exploits a VLAD pooling
strategy on features extracted with a pre-trained network.
While this separates feature extraction and classifier train-
ing, HistNet [52], NetVLAD [1], ActionVLAD [11], and
Deep FisherNet [49] constitute end-to-end learning frame-
works leveraging BoW, VLAD and Fisher Vector represen-
tations, respectively. Here, we contribute to this effort with
a new deep architecture that incorporates the notion of in-
terpretability in the BoW representation.
Interpreting CNNs. Attempts at interpreting the represen-
tations learned by CNNs or their predictions remain few,
and existing methods follow two main trends. The first
one [36, 35, 41, 55] focuses on visualizing the CNN fil-
ters in a post-training stage, by either inverting the network,
or performing gradient ascent in image space to maximize
neuron’s activations. The second trend consists of identify-
ing the image regions that bear the most responsibility for
the prediction. Note that this idea can be traced back to
non-deep learning strategies, such as image representations
based on object detectors [32] and classemes [50], and even
part-based models [7, 8, 9]. In the deep learning context,
this was introduced by [57], extended in [46], both of which
use a post-training strategy. This was followed by [51] that
incorporates an attention module at every layer of the net-
work. In [56], an additional loss function was designed to
assign each CNN filter to an object part. Recently [10, 39]
have proposed to leverage attention maps during pooling
operations. In this paper, we introduce an alternative way to
interpret the prediction of a CNN by providing a visual and
semantic representation to the codewords of a BoW model.
While [39] also relies on a histogram-based representation,
their approach differs fundamentally from ours, in that it
does not assign a visual interpretation to the codebook.
Adversarial attacks and detection. When the sensi-
tivity of deep networks to adversarial attacks was iden-
tified [48], initial works focused on developing defense
strategies [14, 28], aiming to robustify the networks. How-
ever, these defenses were typically found to be vulnerable to
optimization-based techniques [5]. Therefore, the research
focus has increasingly shifted towards detecting adversarial
samples, thus allowing one to discard them instead of at-
tempting to be robust to them. In this context, [37] proposed
to use a separate subnetwork to detect adversarial exam-
ples; [16] relies on knowledge distillation and Bayesian un-
certainty to train a simple logistic regression detector; [34]
exploits a measure of local intrinsic dimensionality to iden-
tify the adversarial examples. Here, we show that we can
outperform all these methods by learning to compare the in-
put image with the visual representation of the most highly
activated codeword in our interpretable BoW network.
Another problem related to adversarial sample detection
is that of identifying out-of-distribution (OOD) examples.
This task has been addressed by training a detector on the
softmax scores of a network [21], extended in [33] by an ad-
ditional pre-processing of the network input. The contem-
porary work [31] introduced a unified framework for adver-
sarial and OOD sample detection based on the Mahalanobis
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distance between hidden features and their class-conditional
distributions. Here, unlike existing methods, we base our
adversarial and OOD detection framework directly on a vi-
sual and semantic interpretation of the network’s prediction.
This, we believe, would further give one the possibility to
visually analyze the successful attacks, opening the door to
human intervention in the detection process, while facilitat-
ing the human’s task.
3. Method
In this section, we first introduce our interpretable BoW
networks. We then show how to use the resulting vi-
sual codebook as a cue to detect adversarial and out-of-
distribution (OOD) samples.
3.1. Interpretable BoW Networks
Typically, deep neural networks aggregate the local fea-
tures of the convolutional maps, including the last one, us-
ing average or max pooling, which does not separately ac-
count for the contributions of the individual image regions.
By contrast, here, we aim to leverage a BoW representa-
tion, where these individual contributions are preserved by
comparing each local feature to the elements of a code-
book. More specifically, we draw our inspiration from the
histogram-based models of [52, 1, 49], but propose to pro-
vide an interpretable representation of the codebook. Be-
low, we first formalize the BoW network, and then intro-
duce our interpretable representation.
BoW network. Formally, let I be an image input to a
CNN, and X ∈ RW×H×D be the feature map output by
the CNN’s last convolutional layer, with spatial resolution
W×H andD channels. X can be thought of asM =W ·H
local descriptors xi of dimension D. We then introduce a
BoW layer that, given a codebook B with K codewords,
produces a K-dimensional representation of the form
h(X) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
hi(xi) , (1)
which aggregates local histogram-like vectors for each fea-
ture xi. We express these local vectors as
hi(xi) = [a0(xi), a1(xi), · · · , aK(xi)]T , (2)
where ak(xi) is given by
ak(xi) =
e−α‖xi−bk‖
2∑
k′ e
−α‖xi−bk′‖2
. (3)
This value represents the assignment of descriptor xi to
codeword bk. Note that, in the classical BoW formalism,
the assignments are binary, with each descriptor being as-
signed to a single codeword. Within a deep learning con-
text, for differentiability, we relax them as soft assignments,
with α a hyper-parameter defining the softness. The result-
ing BoW vector h(X) then acts as input to the final classi-
fication layer of the network.
To obtain the codebook B, one typically first trains the
base network, with global average pooling (GAP) of X and
a softmax classifier, and then performs K-means clustering
on the local features {xi}Mi=1 of all training samples [1, 49].
Since the codebook is then defined over abstract features,
it does not have a clear visual or semantic meaning. Here,
we propose to provide the codebook with such a meaning,
which then translates to making our BoW network inter-
pretable; given an input image I, one can analyze the pre-
diction by visualizing the representation of the most highly
activated codeword.
Providing interpretability. To obtain a visual and semantic
codebook representation, we propose to exploit the genera-
tor of a pre-trained GAN. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the images
obtained from this generator are passed through the same
base network as that of our BoW model, and the resulting
average-pooled features taken as codewords. As a result, the
set of K generated images {Vk}Kk=1 can be thought of as
a visual dictionary, and each codeword bk in the codebook
B is directly associated to a visual interpretation Vk. As
GANs are now able to generate diverse images that cover
all the classes in a dataset, this visual interpretation inher-
ently comes with a semantic meaning.
Given an input image I, with corresponding final feature
map X, we can obtain an interpretation of its prediction by
observing the visual codeword Vk∗ associated to the most
highly activated codeword, that is,
k∗ = argmax
k
hk(X) , (4)
where hk(X) denotes the kth element of the vector h in
Eq. 1. For a sample from class c, this visual codeword will
typically correspond to an image of the same class. It will,
moreover, depict characteristics similar to that of the input
image, and, as shown in our experiments, different code-
words from the same class c will focus on different charac-
teristics, thus truly acting as prototypes.
Training. In principle, our model can be trained in an end-
to-end manner. We found, however, that training all the dif-
ferent parts jointly from scratch was unstable. To overcome
this, we rely on the following training strategy. We first
pre-train the GAN on the training images of the dataset of
interest, and train the base network of our BoW model us-
ing average pooling with a standard softmax classifier. We
then compute an initial codebook B0 via K-means cluster-
ing of the average-pooled features of the last convolutional
layer of this base network. Specifically, we define an equal
number of codewords S for each class. Thus, for a C-class
dataset, we obtain K = CS codewords, and force each
group of S codewords to come from the same class dur-
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Figure 2: Interpretable BoW network for adversarial sample detection. An input image is passed through the network,
and we retrieve the visual codeword with highest activation. We then pass these two images through a two-stream model
which compares them using the Euclidean distance in feature space, so as to determine if they belong to the same class.
ing the clustering procedure. Note that this further encodes
the notion of semantic meaning of each codeword.
To obtain a visual representation of each codeword in
B0, we optimize the input z of the generator, whose weights
are fixed, so as to generate an image that, when passed
through the base network, yields features that are close to
the codeword in the least-square sense. That is, formally,
for each codeword b0,k in B0, we solve
z∗k = argmin
z
‖f(g(z))− b0,k‖2 , (5)
where g(·) represents the generator, and f(·) the base net-
work up to the last average pooling operation. We then
take our codebook B to be the set of generated features
{f(g(z∗k))}, and train our BoW model by replacing the
base network classification layer with a layer that maps the
BoW representation to the class labels and using the stan-
dard cross-entropy loss.
Note that, while this training procedure may seem costly,
this has no effect on the computational cost at test time.
Indeed, inference only involves a forward pass through our
BoW network, which, compared to the base network, only
requires us to store the additional codebook B; that is, the
generator network is not needed anymore.
3.2. Detecting Adversarial Examples
By providing a visual and semantic meaning related to
the network’s prediction, our interpretable BoW network
can be leveraged to detect adversarial examples. The rea-
soning behind this is the following: Typically, adversarial
attacks aim to add the smallest amount of perturbation to
an image so that the network misclassifies it. While this
perturbation should be imperceptible to humans, it should
strongly affect the resulting deep representation. In our
case, this representation is the BoW one, and, for misclassi-
fication to occur, the most highly activated codeword should
typically be associated to the wrong class. As such, its vi-
sual representation should look significantly different from
the adversarial example. We therefore propose to train an
adversary detector network that, given two input images,
predicts whether they belong to the same class or not.
Formally, our detection framework, depicted by Fig. 2,
proceeds as follows. An image I, adversarial or not, is
passed through our interpretable BoW network, and we re-
trieve the visual codeword Vk∗ corresponding to the high-
est activation using Eq. 4. We then pass I and Vk∗ to our
adversary detector, which outputs a binary label indicating
whether the two images belong to the same class or not. If
they don’t, then I is detected as an adversarial example.
Our detector is a two-stream network that extracts fea-
tures for the two images independently. To train this net-
work, we make use of the contrastive loss [19] , which
aims to make the Euclidean distance between pairs of mis-
matched images larger than a margin m = 1, while mini-
mizing that of matching pairs. Detection is then performed
by comparing the Euclidean distance to the margin.
While, in our experiments, we train the detector to iden-
tify adversarial examples, it can also be used to detect OOD
samples, even without any re-training. In essence, the intu-
ition remains unchanged: An OOD sample will activate a
codeword whose visual representation looks different from
the input image. The detection procedure is thus the same
as in the case of adversarial examples.
4. Experiments
We now empirically evaluate our interpretable BoW net-
works. To this end, we first analyze the semantic meaning
of the learned visual dictionaries. We then demonstrate their
benefits to detect adversarial and out-of-distribution sam-
ples. In these experiments, we used the standard benchmark
datasets employed for adversarial sample detection, that is,
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Dataset Base network BoW network
MNIST 99.23 99.15
FMNIST 92.46 92.06
CIFAR-10 87.54 87.95
SVHN 92.43 91.81
Table 1: Classification accuracy (in %) of the base and
BoW networks. Note that both models perform on par, but
the BoW one allows us to obtain a visual interpretation.
MNIST [30], F-MNIST [53], CIFAR-10 [25], SVHN [40].
Implementation details. For our comparisons to be mean-
ingful, we rely on the same base architecture as in [34] on
each dataset. This architecture is first trained with a softmax
classifier for 50-100 epochs and used to compute the initial
codebook B0. In parallel, we train either a GAN [13] or a
WGAN [18], depending on the dataset, for 100k iterations.
From the resulting generator and B0, we obtain our inter-
pretable codebook B following the procedure described in
Section 3.1. We then train the classification layer of our
interpretable BoW model for 40 epochs.
In all our experiments, we set α = 100 in the BoW soft-
assignment policy of Eq. 3, and use the Adam [23] opti-
mizer with a learning rate of 0.001 and a decay rate of 0.1
applied every 20 epochs. Due to space limitation, we pro-
vide the detail of the base classifier and the GAN archi-
tecture in the supplementary material. The test errors on
MNIST, FMNIST, CIFAR-10, and SVHN using the soft-
max classifier and the BoW one are given in Table 1. In
essence, both classifiers perform on par. Note that our goal
here is not to advocate for superior performance of the BoW
model, but rather for its use to provide a visual interpreta-
tion, as discussed below.
4.1. Visualizing BoW Codewords
Each codeword in our BoW model is directly associated
with an image generated by a GAN. In Fig. 3, we visual-
ize these images for MNIST, FMNIST, SVHN and CIFAR-
10. Zooming in on the figure confirms that the learned
codebooks nicely cover the diversity of the classes in these
datasets. For example, in FMNIST, each garment appears in
a variety of sizes and styles. Similarly, in CIFAR-10, each
object appears in different colors, orientations and in front
of different backgrounds. Furthermore, and more impor-
tantly, each one of these images retains the semantic mean-
ing of the class label for which it was generated. This will
prove key to the success of our adversarial sample detector,
as discussed in the next section.
In the top row of Fig. 4, we show the codewords with
highest activation for a few correctly-classified images of
each dataset. Note that, in most cases, the corresponding
codeword has the same semantic meaning as the input im-
age, not only because it corresponds to the same class, but
(a) MNIST codewords (b) FMNIST codewords
(c) SVHN codewords (d) CIFAR-10 codewords
Figure 3: Visual interpretations of the BoW codebooks.
Every two rows correspond to one class. Note that these
codewords capture the diversity of the classes in each
dataset (better seen by zooming in).
also because it depicts a visually similar content, e.g., in
terms of color and orientation. More such visualizations are
provided in the supplementary material.
4.2. Adversarial Attacks
We make use of the state-of-the-art attack methods,
FGSM [14], BIM-a [28], BIM-b [28], DeepFool [38] and
CW [5], to evaluate (i) the robustness of our interpretable
BoW model to adversarial samples; and (ii) the effective-
ness of our detection strategy. In both cases, following com-
mon practice [34], we discard the images that were misclas-
sified by the original networks from this evaluation.
To first validate our intuition that adversarial samples
will activate codewords corresponding to the wrong classes,
and that these codewords will be visually dissimilar to the
input image, in the bottom row of Fig. 4, we provide the
most highly activated codeword images for a few success-
ful adversarial attacks. Note that these images are indeed
semantically and visually different, which will facilitate the
task of our detector.
4.2.1 Robustness of Interpretable BoW Networks
Before evaluating the effectiveness of our detection strategy,
we study the robustness of our BoW model to the adversar-
ial attacks. In particular, we focus on white-box attacks,
where the attacker has access to the exact model it aims
to fool. There are two ways to attack our BoW model: One
can generate adversarial examples either for the BoW model
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Figure 4: Visualization of the most highly activated codeword for normal and adversarial samples. Each two rows
within a block show the input image (top) and corresponding codeword (bottom). The adversarial examples were obtained
with a BIM-a attack. Additional visualizations for other datasets and attacks are provided in the supplementary material.
itself, or for the base network. We refer to the latter as
transferred BoW (T-BoW) attacks. In Table 2, we compare
the success rates of different attack strategies on our BoW
model with those on the base network. Note that attacks
directly targeting our BoW model are significantly less suc-
cessful than those on the base network. While transferring
the adversarial samples of the base model to our BoW net-
work is more effective than the direct attacks, the success
rates remain lower than on the base model. Note that, as
shown in the supplementary material, the L2 norm of the
perturbations was similar for all network settings. This,
we believe, shows that our BoW models are more robust
than traditional networks to adversarial attacks. Neverthe-
less, some attacks are successful, and we now turn to the
problem of detecting them.
4.2.2 Detecting Adversarial Samples
Adversarial detector. We now evaluate the effectiveness of
the detection strategy introduced in Section 3.2. To this end,
we train our detector using adversarial examples generated
by the white-box attacks discussed above. Specifically, we
report results obtained with two training strategies. Strategy
1, which is commonly used [34], consists of defining a bal-
anced training set comprised of normal images (positives)
and their adversarial counterparts (negatives). A drawback
of this strategy, however, is that, as shown above, many at-
tacks are unsuccessful with our BoW model, and consid-
ering such samples as negatives essentially adds noise to
our training process, since unsuccessful adversarial samples
will typically activate a codeword that is similar to the in-
Dataset Model FGM BIM-a BIM-b CW
MNIST
Base 93.68 100.0 100.0 100.0
T- Bow 92.70 38.94 100.0 31.40
BoW 39.23 23.96 23.96 3.9
F-MNIST
Base 99.64 100.0 100.0 100.0
T- Bow 98.80 65.52 100.0 49.08
BoW 57.78 32.09 31.97 66.78
SVHN
Base 97.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
T- Bow 96.83 93.77 100.0 75.24
BoW 73.39 73.11 72.24 86.42
CIFAR-10
Base 82.70 97.10 97.10 100.0
T- Bow 82.66 94.12 97.15 76.92
BoW 60.66 94.18 93.93 99.99
Table 2: Success rates of white-box attacks on the base
network and on our BoW network. Note that, whether
attacked directly (BoW) or via the base network (T-BoW),
our model is more robust to adversarial attacks.
put image. To overcome this, we therefore propose Strategy
2, which consists of using only the successful adversarial
examples as negatives during training. The resulting train-
ing set, however, is then imbalanced. The detailed detector
architectures are provided in the supplementary material.
Comparison with the state of the art. We compare our ap-
proach with the state-of-the-art BU [17] and LID [34] meth-
ods, which have proven more robust than the earlier detec-
tion strategy [6]. In Table 3, we report the area under the
ROC curve (AUROC) for BU, LID and our method, using
both Strategy 1 and Strategy 2. In this case, the results were
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Dataset Feature FGSM BIM-a BIM-b CW
MNIST
KD+BU 95.22/94.11 82.54/72.80 82.17/72.43 50.17/60.01
LID 92.66/91.18 82.24/61.90 83.06/75.61 51.81/68.46
Ours 100.00/100.0 100.0/100.0 100.0/100.0 50.87/ 100.0
F-MNIST
KD+BU 99.33/99.36 91.35/87.32 89.43/85.39 69.68/65.83
LID 93.88/93.93 86.95/81.06 86.83/81.11 73.23/70.84
Ours 100.0/100.0 100.0/100.0 100.0/100.0 83.97/97.96
SVHN
KD+BU 78.21/74.24 78.37/73.97 67.96/71.46 88.68/88.62
LID 99.88/99.25 83.45/84.17 85.76/90.42 91.23/91.40
Ours 99.9/100.0 98.71/96.16 99.9/100.0 96.52/96.49
CIFAR-10
KD+BU 72.79/69.66 86.23/85.69 60.23/62.52 93.74/93.74
LID 89.67/89.26 85.40/85.02 80.55/82.79 93.57/93.17
Ours 99.37/99.97 93.90/97.47 99.90/99.96 96.52/96.35
Table 3: AUROC scores for BU, LID and our detector for
direct BoW attacks. Left and right numbers correspond to
Strategy 1 and Strategy 2, respectively.
Dataset Feature FGSM BIM-a BIM-b CW
MNIST
KD+BU 93.73/93.63 86.09/83.09 79.22/79.22 80.64/80.64
LID 99.17/99.15 99.75/99.75 95.16/96.16 99.01/99.03
Ours 100.00/100.0 100.0/100.0 100.0/100. 99.85/100.0
F-MNIST
KD+BU 96.99/97.03 92.60/92.60 97.74/97.74 93.27/93.27
LID 95.68/95.68 95.95/95.95 95.24/95.24 97.31/97.31
Ours 100.0/100.0 99.98/100.0 100.0/100.0 98.26/97.96
SVHN
KD+BU 85.04/85.08 88.06/88.06 99.99/99.99 92.85/92.85
LID 99.88/99.32 88.45/84.17 98.76/99.93 94.23/94.23
Ours 99.99/100.0 96.66/96.25 100.0/100.0 95.61/96.86
CIFAR-10
KD+BU 75.75/74.67 80.02/79.69 99.12/99.24 96.06/96.05
LID 87.16/87.92 82.17/81.77 99.91/99.91 97.54/97.56
Ours 99.80/99.71 96.77/96.87 99.77/99.85 96.70/97.24
Table 4: AUROC scores for BU, LID and our detector
for attacks on the base network. Left and right numbers
correspond to Strategy 1 and Strategy 2, respectively.
obtained using the adversarial examples generated with a
white-box attack on our BoW model directly. As such, BU
and LID were also applied to our BoW model. Note that
we outperform the state of the art in all but one case, by
a particularly large margin when the results are not already
saturated, such as with BIM-a on SVHN and CIFAR-10 and
with FGSM on CIFAR-10. The only case where we don’t is
with CW on MNIST, with Strategy 1. Note, however, that,
as shown in Table 2, in this case, CW only has a 3.9% suc-
cess rate. This results in Strategy 1 having access to very
few training samples. By contrast, with Strategy 2, we out-
perform the baselines for the CW attack by a large margin.
In Table 4, we provide similar results for attacks targeted to
the base network. The conclusions are the same: We out-
perform the baselines in most cases, and by a large margin
where there remained room for improvement.
Similarly to [34], we also evaluate whether our detector
trained for one specific attack generalizes to other ones. In
Table 5, we compare the generalizability of our approach
and of LID. For each method, we show the results of the
model that was trained on the attack that makes it generalize
best to the other ones. Note that the performance of our
detector is virtually unaffected. While LID also generalizes
well, our method still outperforms it in most cases, and by
a large margin in several scenarios.
Dataset Method Train FGSM BIM-a BIM-b CW
MNIST LID FGSM 91.18 65.48 64.42 29.05Ours BIM-a 100.0 100.0 100.0 97.56
F-MNIST LID FGSM 93.88 82.24 82.58 65.03Ours CW 97.39 97.13 95.85 97.96
SVHN-10 LID FGSM 99.25 77.54 79.77 75.16Ours BIM-a 91.41 96.25 91.30 94.73
CIFAR-10 LID FGSM 89.26 66.55 68.33 66.05Ours BIM-a 86.90 97.47 95.02 95.44
Table 5: Generalizing to different attacks. We compare
the results of LID and our detector in the scenario where
the detectors were trained for a specific attack, but tested on
different ones. These results were obtained with Strategy 2.
Dataset Attack success rate Detector AUROC
F-MNIST 33.11 96.22
SVHN 94.58 96.54
CIFAR-10 99.95 97.47
Table 6: Adaptive attacks. Our detector remains robust to
an attacker that knows our detection strategy.
4.3. Attacking the Detector
In the previous set of experiments, we have worked un-
der the assumption that the attacker only had access to our
BoW model, but not to the detector. Here, we remove this
assumption, and study two more challenging scenarios. In
the first one, the attacker knows our detection strategy, but
not the model we use. In the second, the attacker also has
access to our detector.
4.3.1 Adaptive Attack
To evaluate the robustness of our approach in the scenario
where the attacker is aware of our detection scheme, we ap-
ply an adaptive CW attack strategy similar to the ones used
in [4, 34] to attack the KD & LID detectors, respectively.
To this end, we modify the objective of the CW attack as
argmin
Iadv
‖(I− Iadv‖22+α ·
(
`(Iadv)+‖φ(I)− φ(Iadv)‖22).
(6)
The first two terms correspond to the original CW attack,
with α balancing the amount of perturbation and the adver-
sarial strength, that is, how strongly one forces the adversar-
ial image to be misclassified. The last term directly reflects
our detection strategy and encourages the BoW representa-
tion of the real, φ(I), and adversarial, φ(Iadv), images to
be similar. The rationale behind this is that the attack then
aims to find an adversarial perturbation such that the sam-
ple is not only misclassified, but also has a representation
close to that of the real image, thus breaking the premise on
which our detector is built.
In Table 6, we report both the success rate of this adap-
tive attack on our BoW model and the AUROC of our de-
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Dataset Classifier Detector Attack success rate Attack success rate on detectorattack attack on detector trained with adversarial training
MNIST FGSM FGSM 0.00 0.0
CW CW 100.00 8.0
F-MNIST FGSM FGSM 2.8 0.0CW CW 100 27.2
Table 7: White-box detector attacks. An attacker that has
access to our BoW network, GAN and detector can indeed
be successful when using the CW attack, but not the FGSM
one. However, adversarial training allows us to robustify
our approach to these attacks, as shown in the right column.
tector, trained with Strategy 2. Note that our detector still
yields high AUROC, thus showing that it remains robust to
an attacker that knows our detection strategy.
4.3.2 White-box Detector Attacks
We now evaluate the robustness of our method in the case
where the attacker has access to all our models, that is, the
BoW model, the GAN and the adversarial sample detector.
Note that access to the parameters of the generator and de-
tector networks is not a mild assumption since information
about the training data is required to compute them.
To attack our complete framework, we generate adver-
sarial images Iadv in a two-step fashion. First, we attack
the BoW classifier to generate an intermediate adversarial
image I0adv that activates codeword j corresponding to im-
age Vj in the visual codebook. Second, we attack the de-
tector to misclassify Vj as being similar to the input image.
Since our detector relies on the distance between the input
image and the codeword in feature space, fooling it can be
achieved by finding a perturbation that solves the optimiza-
tion problem
min
Iadv
∥∥I0adv − Iadv∥∥22 + α · ‖γ(Vj)− γ(Iadv)‖22 , (7)
where γ(·) is the feature-extraction part of our detector.
We found that, as is, our detector is indeed vulnerable
to such an attack. To circumvent this, we therefore rely on
the adversarial training strategy of [15], in which the detec-
tor is trained using dynamically-generated adversarial im-
ages. We observed that, after a few epochs of such dynamic
training, our detector becomes robust to these white-box at-
tacks. To evidence this, in Table 7, we provide the results
of a white-box attack on a detector dynamically trained on
limited balanced set of 10K samples and evaluated on 1K
samples. These results show that our approach has become
much more robust to this attack.
4.4. Detecting Out-of-distribution Samples
We now evaluate the use of our approach to detect OOD
samples. Following the setup of [21], we perform experi-
ments using either SVHN [40] or MNIST [25] as training
In-Dataset In-Dataset Adversarial examples OOD samplesBaseline [21] / Ours
SVHN CIFAR-10 87.44/97.26 87.92/99.14LSUN 89.06/99.87 89.06/99.98
TinyImageNet 89.97/99.76 89.97/99.93
MNIST-10 Not-MNIST 77.11/97.44 77.23/99.98OMNIGLOT 82.11/97.01 82.24/100.0
CIFAR 79.84/99.21 79.84/100.0
Table 8: Detecting OOD samples. We compare our de-
tector with the baseline method of [21] and with the recent
ODIN [33] one in the case where we only observe adversar-
ial samples during training (left) and when we have access
to a few OOD samples (right).
datasets from which the in-distribution samples are drawn.
The goal then is to detect OOD samples coming from other
datasets, such as LSUN [54], TinyImageNet [26], Om-
niglot [29], Not-MNIST [3]. We consider two settings: In
the first, the detection method does not see any OOD sam-
ples during training, but has access to adversarial examples
generated by the BIM-a attack; in the second, the detector
has access to 1000 images from the OOD dataset. In Ta-
ble 8, we compare the results of our approach with those
of the baseline method [21] and of ODIN [33]. Note that
we clearly outperform them, both when we see OOD sam-
ples during training and in the more realistic case where we
don’t. We believe that this demonstrates the generality of
our approach.
5. Conclusion
We have introduced a novel approach to interpreting a
CNN’s prediction, by providing the elements in a BoW
codebook with a visual and semantic meaning. We have
then proposed to leverage the visual representation of these
interpretable BoW networks for adversarial example detec-
tion. Our experiments have evidenced that (i) our inter-
pretable BoW networks are more robust to adversarial at-
tacks; (ii) our adversary detection strategy outperforms the
state-of-the-art ones; (iii) our approach could be made ro-
bust to adversarial attacks to the detector itself; (iv) our
framework generalizes to OOD sample detection. In the
future, following the intuition that complex scenes and ob-
jects can be modeled as sets of parts, we plan to extend our
interpretable BoW representation to part-based ones. This,
we believe, will also translate to improved adversary detec-
tion performance, since it will allow us to robustly combine
the decision of each part.
6. Conclusion
We have introduced a novel approach to interpreting a
CNN’s prediction, by providing the elements in a BoW
codebook with a visual and semantic meaning. We have
then proposed to leverage the visual representation of these
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interpretable BoW networks for adversarial example detec-
tion. Our experiments have evidenced that (i) our inter-
pretable BoW networks are more robust to adversarial at-
tacks; (ii) our adversary detection strategy outperforms the
state-of-the-art ones; (iii) our approach could be made ro-
bust to adversarial attacks to the detector itself; (iv) our
framework generalizes to OOD sample detection. In the
future, following the intuition that complex scenes and ob-
jects can be modeled as sets of parts, we plan to extend our
interpretable BoW representation to part-based ones. This,
we believe, will also translate to improved adversary detec-
tion performance, since it will allow us to robustly combine
the decision of each part.
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Below, we provide additional details regarding our archi-
tectures and our experimental results.
7. Architectures
As base networks for our models, we used the same ar-
chitectures as in [34]. These architectures are provided in
Table 9 for the MNIST, FMNIST experiments, in Table 10
for SVHN experiments and in Table 11 for the CIFAR-10
experiments. For the detector in our adversarial example
detection approach, we used the architecture shown in Ta-
ble 12 for all datasets, except for CIFAR-10. In this case,
we used a ResNet-20 [20]1 due to the higher image variance
and background complexity of this dataset.
We also trained a GAN [13] for MNIST and FMNIST
and a WGAN [18] for SVHN and CIFAR-10. The archi-
tectures of the generator for MNIST and FMNIST are pro-
vided in Table 13 and in Table 15 for SVHN and CIFAR-
10. Similarly, the discriminator for MNIST and FMNIST is
provided in Table 14 and the one for SVHN and CIFAR-10
in Table 16.
Layer Parameters
Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 64
Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 64
MaxPool 2× 2
Dense + ReLU 128
Softmax 10
Table 9: Base network for MNIST, FMNIST.
Layer Parameters
Convolution + ReLU 3× 3× 64
Convolution + ReLU 3× 3× 64
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + ReLU 3× 3× 128
Convolution + ReLU 3× 3× 128
MaxPool 2× 2
Dense + ReLU 512
Dense + ReLU 128
Softmax 10
Table 10: Base network for SVHN.
8. Additional Results on Normal Samples
We visualize the learned codewords on various datasets
in Fig. 5. We also provide additional visualizations of the
activated visual codewords for normal samples of MNIST,
FMNIST, SVHN and CIFAR-10 in Fig. 6. We further vi-
sualize the images assigned to a particular codeword in
Figs. 7, 8, 9 and 10 for MNIST, FMNIST, SVHN and
1https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/official/resnet
Layer Parameters
Convolution + ReLU 3× 3× 32
Convolution + ReLU 3× 3× 32
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + ReLU 3× 3× 64
Convolution + ReLU 3× 3× 64
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + ReLU 3× 3× 128
Convolution + ReLU 3× 3× 128
MaxPool 2× 2
Dense + ReLU 1024
Dense + ReLU 512
Softmax 10
Table 11: Base network for CIFAR-10.
Layer Parameters
Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 32
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 64
MaxPool 2× 2
Fully Connected + ReLU 128
Fully Connected + ReLU 128
Table 12: Detector for MNIST, FMNIST and SVHN.
Layer Parameters
Input noise, z ∈ R128 Nil
Dense + ReLU 128× 4× 4
Deconvolution + ReLU 5× 5× 128
Deconvolution + ReLU 5× 5× 64
Deconvolution + Sigmoid 5× 5× 1
Table 13: Generator for MNIST and FMNIST
Layer Parameters
Input image, I ∈ R28×28 Nil
Convolution + LeakyReLU, stride=2 5× 5× 64
Convolution + LeakyReLU, stride=2 5× 5× 128
Convolution + LeakyReLU, stride=2 5× 5× 256
Fully Connected + ReLU 1
Table 14: Discriminator for MNIST and FMNIST
Layer Parameters
Input noise, z ∈ R128 Nil
Dense 128× 4× 4
ResBlock + Up 128
ResBlock + Up 128
ResBlock + Up 128
Convolution + Tanh 3× 3× 3
Table 15: Generator for SVHN and CIFAR-10 similar to
the ones used in [18]
CIFAR-10 respectively. Finally, the misclassified normal
11
Layer Parameters
Input image, I ∈ R32×32×3 Nil
ResBlock + Down 128
ResBlock + Down 128
ResBlock +Down + GAP 128
Dense 1
Table 16: Discriminator for SVHN and CIFAR-10 similar
to the ones used in [18]
samples for all datasets are shown in Fig. 11.
9. Adversarial Attack Implementations
We used the Cleverhans library2 to generate adversarial
images following the same settings as in [34]. In Table 17,
we report the mean L2 perturbation of the adversarial im-
ages for different attack methods. Note that FGSM and
BIM-b tend to yield larger perturbations than BIM-a and
CW.
Dataset Model FGSM BIM-a BIM-b CW
MNIST Base 7.45 2.67 6.73 1.55BoW 8.01 3.30 3.45 0.04
F-MNIST Base 4.61 1.01 4.07 0.90BoW 4.62 1.78 2.07 0.97
CIFAR-10 Base 2.74 0.46 2.12 0.35BoW 2.73 0.66 1.54 0.45
SVHN Base 7.08 1.02 6.16 1.16BoW 7.09 1.75 3.48 1.52
Table 17: Mean L2 perturbation of the adversarial images
on the base and BoW networks with different attack strate-
gies.
10. Influence of the Number of Codewords
We evaluate the influence of the hyper-parameter K in
Eq. 2 of the main paper, which defines the number of code-
words in our BoW models.To this end, in Table 18, we re-
port the detection AUROC for different values of K with
FGSM attack on various datasets with evaluation Strategy
2. Perhaps surprisingly, with as few as K = 50 clusters (5
clusters per class), we still obtain high AUROCs.
K 50 100 500 1000
MNIST 99.95 100.0 100.0 100.0
FMNIST 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SVHN 99.33 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 18: Influence of K on detection AUROC
2https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
11. Additional Results on Adversarial Samples
We also provide additional visualizations of activated
visual codewords for adversarial samples of MNIST, FM-
NIST, SVHN and CIFAR-10 in Figs. 12, 13, 14 and 15, re-
spectively.
12
(a) MNIST (b) FMNIST
(c) SVHN (d) CIFAR-10
Figure 5: Visual interpretations of the BoW codebooks. Every two rows correspond to one class. Note that these codewords
capture the diversity of the classes in each dataset (better seen by zooming in.)
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(a) MNIST (b) FMNIST
(c) SVHN (d) CIFAR-10
Figure 6: Visualization of the most highly activated codeword for normal test samples. Each two rows within a block
show the input image (top) and corresponding codeword (bottom).
14
visual 
codeword dataset images that activates the codeword on the left
Figure 7: Dataset images from MNIST that activate a particular codeword. Each block has two columns. The left one
shows the visual codeword and the right one the test images that activated the codeword on the left. Note that there is a clear
semantic similarity between the images and the codeword, not only in terms of class label, but also with respect to style and
orientation.
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visual 
codeword sample images that activates the codeword on the left
Figure 8: Dataset images from FMNIST that activate a particular codeword. Each block has two columns. The left one
shows the visual codeword and the right one the dataset images that activated the codeword on the left. Note that there is a
clear semantic similarity between the images and the codeword, not only in terms of class label, but also with respect to style
and orientation.
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visual 
codeword sample images that activates the codeword on the left
Figure 9: Dataset images from SVHN that activate a particular codeword. Each block has two columns. The left one
shows the visual codeword and the right one the dataset images that activated the codeword on the left. Note that there is
a clear semantic similarity between the images and the codeword, in terms of class label, but also with respect to style and
orientation.
17
visual 
codeword sample images that activates the codeword on the left
Figure 10: Dataset images from CIFAR-10 that activate a particular codeword. Each block has two columns. The left
one shows the visual codeword and the right one the dataset images that activated the codeword on the left. Note that there is
a clear semantic similarity between the images and the codeword in terms of class label.
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MNIST FMNIST SVHN CIFAR-10
Figure 11: Most highly activated codewords of incorrectly classified test samples on various datasets. Each two rows
within a block show the input image (top) of a specific class and the corresponding codeword (bottom). Note that the images
and their codeword are dissimilar in most cases.
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(a) FGSM (b) BIM-a
(c) BIM-b (d) CW
Figure 12: Most highly activated codewords of adversarial samples obtained with different attack strategies on MNIST
test data. Each two rows within a block show the input image (top) and corresponding codeword (bottom). Note that the
adversarial images and their codeword are dissimilar in most cases. Note that, in the CW case, we have fewer samples in
some of the classes because of the low success rate of this attack.
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(a) FGSM (b) BIM-a
(c) BIM-b (d) CW
Figure 13: Most highly activated codewords of adversarial samples obtained with different attack strategies on FM-
NIST test data. Each two rows within a block show the input image (top) and corresponding codeword (bottom). Note that
the adversarial images and their codeword are dissimilar in most cases.
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(a) FGSM (b) BIM-a
(c) BIM-b (d) CW
Figure 14: Most highly activated codewords of adversarial samples obtained with different attack strategies on SVHN
test data. Each two rows within a block show the input image (top) and corresponding codeword (bottom). Note that the
adversarial images and their codeword are dissimilar in most cases.
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(a) FGSM (b) BIM-a
(c) BIM-b (d) CW
Figure 15: Most highly activated codewords of adversarial samples obtained with different attack strategies on CIFAR-
10 test data. Each two rows within a block show the input image (top) and corresponding codeword (bottom). Note that the
adversarial images and their codeword are dissimilar in most cases.
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